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Abstract
Political parties compete over income tax functions, and voters vote and
decide whether to pay full taxes or to make an e®ort to modify their tax bur-
den. We show that political parties only propose e±cient income tax func-
tions, in a similar manner to the probabilistic voting theory. Regarding the
shape of income tax functions, it need not be the case that the majority of vot-
ers prefer progressive taxation to regressive taxation as a consequence of the
distortions. Nevertheless, we prove that the political appeal for progressivity
is restored under mild conditions.
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11 Introduction
Income taxation and its distortionary e®ects have been analyzed extensively in the
economics literature. A distortion can be broadly de¯ned as a taxpayer's reaction to
his level of tax burden (in the sense that his behavior is altered by the existence of the
tax). Most of the studies dealing with distortions focus on the ine±ciency created by
income taxation. They seek to determine, from a normative point of view, properties
of the tax system so that these ine±ciencies vanish (or similarly to maximize some
social welfare function). In contrast with such a strand of the literature, the present
article adopts a positive perspective. The starting point of our model is the following
observation: as strategic political parties anticipate distortions, they adapt their
electoral promises to maximize their probability of victory. When confronted with
this observation, the main question one might consider is how do political parties
adapt their electoral promises?
In order to provide an answer to this question, we build a simple model in the
Downsian tradition: income tax functions are determined by the electoral competi-
tion of two o±ce-seeking political parties. Taxes are used to ¯nance a public good.
Given the size of the public good, each party makes binding electoral promises to
each voter. Voters di®er in endowed income and bene¯t equally from the public good.
Taxes are distortionary in the sense that they modify voters' behavior. Speci¯cally,
a voter votes for one of the political parties and makes a binary decision. A voter
chooses between paying full taxes and making an e®ort to modify his tax burden1.
In the latter case, the monetary amount the voter must pay is represented by the
cost function. Such a function is common knowledge among both parties and voters.
Examples of distortions studied within this model are labor supply and tax avoid-
ance activities2. Hence, a voter votes for the party that maximizes his ¯nal income
(available income once the binary decision has been made).
Building on this simple model, we address two salient issues of the positive
approach to income taxation: the e±ciency of the electoral competition and the
shape of income tax functions in equilibrium.
1One can think of the voter as choosing between standard taxation and some broadly de¯ned
outside option.
2Tax avoidance can be de¯ned as the wide variety of legal activities people engage in with the
sole purpose of lowering their tax burden. Tax avoidance represents 2 to 7 % of the GDP and 5
to 20 % of the population avoid 10 to 20 % of their o±cial tax payments (for a detailed account,
see Andreoni [1]). The model accounts also for tax evasion but does not incorporate the anti-fraud
mechanisms.
2Vis-µ a-vis the former issue, the distortions in the model can lead to the emergence
of ine±ciencies. Even if the level of public good delivered by the di®erent tax
functions is constant, voters individually decide whether to make an e®ort modifying
the aggregate level of ¯nal income. A tax function is said to be e±cient whenever it
maximizes the aggregate level of ¯nal income, in contrast with an ine±cient one that
does not. We show that parties uniquely propose e±cient income tax functions3.
The reason political competition leads to an e±cient outcome is quite simple. Let us
consider the case where party 1 promises to implement some ine±cient tax function.
Now, suppose that his opponent, party 2, tries to defeat him. As the tax function
proposed by party 1 is ine±cient, it does not maximize the aggregate level of ¯nal
income. For that reason, party 2 can construct a tax function that delivers for every
voter a level of ¯nal income which is equal or higher than the ¯nal income delivered
by the tax function o®ered by party 1. Roughly speaking, it is weakly dominated
for a strategic party to o®er an ine±cient tax function to voters. The idea that
competition between political parties leads to the maximization of a Benthamite
social welfare function is in accordance with the conclusions of the probabilistic
voting models µ a la Lindbeck and Weibull [9].
The second feature of political competition we analyze is the shape of tax func-
tions in equilibrium. The main objective is to understand whether the political
appeal for progressivity is robust with respect to distortions. Such an appeal simply
relies on the fact that any progressive tax function4 is preferred to any regressive tax
function under majority voting in a pure endowment economy; this observation is
satis¯ed only when the median income is lower than the mean5. In order to make our
arguments transparent, we focus on a canonical example: the °at tax game. Voters
are restricted to choosing between paying full taxes proposed by parties and spending
a proportional amount of their endowed income. We ¯rst emphasize how unfounded
the usual arguments given in public debates can be in our setting: the poorest voters
3Technically, we prove that only the e±cient tax functions lie in the uncovered set. As stated
by Banks, Duggan and Le Breton [2], the support of any mixed strategy equilibria of a two-player,
symmetric, zero-sum game lies in the uncovered set, given some conditions which are satis¯ed by
our game.
4We de¯ne progressive taxation in the marginal sense: a tax is said to be progressive whenever
its marginal tax rates are increasing in income (a convex function). Similarly, a regressive tax
function is a concave function.
5This condition over the income distribution is not too disturbing, as most OECD countries
satisfy it. Even if di®erent authors have argued that this appeal is enough to justify the imple-
mentation of progressive taxation, the only work that obtained such a result in an equilibrium
framework is the recent article of Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok [3] (see Section 1.1 for a review).
3need not prefer progressive income taxation. It is even the case that a regressive
tax function is unanimously preferred to a progressive tax function. Hence, situa-
tions exist in which strategic parties advocate regressive taxation. However, such
situations are characterized by constrained policy spaces. In the example provided,
parties can only propose two tax functions: an ine±cient progressive tax function
and an e±cient regressive one. When the policy space is rich enough (it is only
required that parties can propose e±cient progressive and regressive tax functions),
the political appeal for progressivity is restored.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1 presents a review of the literature,
and Section 2 sets up the model of public good provision with distortionary taxes.
Section 3 describes the political game between the two Downsian parties. Section 4
presents the results concerning the e±ciency of the electoral competition. Finally,
Section 5 deals with the shape of income taxation in equilibrium, and Section 6 gives
concluding comments.
1.1 Related literature
This work incorporates political competition into a setting with distortionary taxes
to explore the role of the political arena in shaping income taxation. Such an in-
teraction has not deserved much attention due to the well-known problem of the
inexistence of pure strategy equilibria as a consequence of political cycles: one can
always design a tax function that is preferred by a majority of voters to any other
tax function. The most-used solutions to tackle this problem can be classi¯ed into
two categories: restricting the policy space (linear or quadratic tax functions)6 or
introducing some ideological component into voters' preferences (the so-called proba-
bilistic voting theory7). Whereas the ¯rst approach seems too arti¯cially constrained
(one might wonder which is the good restriction), the second one has become a stan-
dard approach in political economics.
This paper takes a much more seldom used route: keeping the richness of the
policy space and focusing on equilibria in mixed strategies without incorporating
ideological concerns. In our model, a voter votes for the party that o®ers him the
highest level of ¯nal income. This idea leads to a discontinuity in a party's payo®,
6The main examples of this strand of literature are Meltzer and Richard [12], Roberts [17] and
Romer [18].
7See Chapter 2 in Person and Tabellini [15] and the works of Lindbeck and Weibull[9] and
Coughlin [4].
4as voters abruptly change their vote from one party to the other in contrast with
probabilistic voting models. In such models, if party 1 increases his promise of ¯nal
income to some group of voters, the share of voters in this group that vote for party 1
increases continuously. Hence, the role of mixed strategies in our model is to smooth
the party's payo®s, allowing the existence of equilibrium. Such an approach has been
used by Myerson [14], Laslier[8], Lizzeri and Persico [10] and Crutzen and Sahuguet
[5]. However, these models assume that voters are ex-ante equal, and hence they
do not deal with the shape of income taxation in equilibrium. To our knowledge,
only one recent paper (Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok [3]) focuses on the mixed strategy
approach to determine the shape of income taxation. Their work focuses on a pure
endowment economy where voters di®er only by income level. They ¯nd that when
parties are restricted to propose either progressive or regressive taxation, they only
advocate progressive taxation in equilibrium (given that the median income is lower
than the mean income). Nevertheless, when this restriction is softened (any shape
of income taxation is permitted), the probability that parties advocate progressive
taxation is strictly lower than one.
2 The basic setting
We consider an economy with a continuum of voters. Voters only di®er in endowed
income, x 2 [0;1], distributed according to a distribution function F belonging to the
set of distribution functions F. The function F is assumed to be an increasing and
di®erentiable continuous function with F(0) = 0 and F(1) = 1. By de¯nition, pF
denotes the probability measure induced by F on [0,1]. Formally, the share of voters
whose endowed income is located in the set A µ [0;1] equals pF(A) =
R 1
0 1AdF. We
consider the set of distribution functions F as a metric space under the sup-metric.
There are two parties in the election denoted by 1 and 2. A pure strategy for
a party is a function which assigns to each endowed income an amount of taxation
due to the government. Due to the distortions present within the model, an ex-ante
tax function represents the o±cial tax payments of a voter, whereas an ex-post tax
function stands for the actual level of expenditures of voters once the distortions
have been taken into account.
De¯nition 1 (Ex-ante tax function). A function T 2 C[0;1] is an ex-ante tax
function if it satis¯es the following two properties:
51. 0 · T(x) · x for all x 2 [0;1] ,
2. x 7¡! T(x) and x 7¡! x ¡ T(x) are increasing functions on [0;1].
Whereas Property 1 implies that voters do not face negative taxation or taxation
larger than their income, Property 2 implies that the tax burden increases with
income and that pre-tax and post-tax income rankings are identical.
As previously discussed, taxes are distortionary in the sense that they modify
voters' behavior. Given an ex-ante tax function T, the voter decides whether to pay
full taxes or to make an e®ort. In the latter case, the monetary amount the voter
must pay is represented by the cost function c(T) (which might depend on T). This
cost function is common knowledge for both parties and voters.
The voter's decision is simple. For any ex-ante tax function T and its associated
function c(T), a voter chooses to pay full taxes if this choice results in a higher ¯nal
income than making an e®ort, i.e.,
a voter with income x pays full taxes i® x ¡ T(x) ¸ x ¡ c(T)(x):
The set ET stands for the set of voters who pay full taxes:
ET = fx 2 [0;1] j T(x) · c(T)(x)g:
Formally, given an ex-ante tax function T, its associated cost function c(T) has
two components: the amount of money collected by the government TG and the
deadweight cost of making an e®ort TP.
De¯nition 2 (Cost function). Given a function T 2 C[0;1], a cost function is a
continuous function that satis¯es
c(T)(x) = TG(x) + TP(x):
Besides, a cost function satis¯es the following properties for any S 2 C[0;1]:
1. (Linearity.) c("S+(1¡")T)(x) = "c(S)(x)+(1¡")c(T)(x) for any " 2 [0;1],
2. (Monotonicity.) if S(x) · T(x) for any x 2 (0;1) then c(S)(x) · c(T)(x) for
any x 2 [0;1],
6The ¯rst cost function property simply states that the cost function of a linear
combination of two ex-ante tax functions equals the linear combination of the cost
function corresponding to the two ex-ante tax functions. This property implies
some linearity with respect to the tax function T 8. The second property states that
if every voter has a tax burden with tax function S which is lower or equal to the
one with tax function T, the cost function corresponding to S is lower than or equal
to the cost function corresponding to T.
Generally speaking, we consider that a cost function represents tax avoidance
activities whenever TP(x) > 0 for any x 2 (0;1); the amount of money which is
not collected by the government represents a cost for the voter. With such a cost
function, the voter faces a trade-o® between either paying full taxes or incurring a
cost to reduce his personal tax burden.
Example 1: The °at tax. For some a 2 [0;1], c(T)(x) = ax. Independently
of the ex-ante function T, the voter can simply pay a proportional amount of his
income which is not collected by the government to supply the public good. Hence,
a voter with endowed income x gets a ¯nal income which equals either x ¡ T(x) or
(1¡a)x. Both properties of the cost function are satis¯ed as c("T +(1¡")S)(x) =
ax = "T(x) + (1 ¡ ")S(x) and c(T)(x) = ax for any T 2 C[0;1]. This example is
particularly appealing in the debate over how should a government modify its tax
system when some neighbor country sets up a °at tax. As will be shown in Section
5, progressive taxation is implemented in presence of a °at tax alternative.
Example 2: Tax avoidance. For some a;b 2 [0;1], c(T)(x) = a+bT(x). Voters
can avoid declaring a share (1 ¡ b)T(x) of their taxable income through investing
a ¯xed amount a in tax avoidance. For any given ex-ante tax function T, the cost
function satis¯es c(T)(x) = a + bT(x). A voter chooses to invest an amount a in
tax avoidance if that choice results in higher utility than paying full taxes; that is
if T(x) > a + bT(x). Whenever a voter avoids paying taxes, the amount of money
he allocates to the government is equal to TG(x) = bT(x), and parameter a stands
for the amount of money which is not collected by the government TP. To see that
this modeling satis¯es the ¯rst condition, it su±ces to see that for any function
8Examples of functions that do not satisfy property 1 are c(T)(x) = T(x)2 or c(T)(x) =
log(T(x)).
7S 2 C[0;1] and for any " 2 [0;1]:
c("S + (1 ¡ ")T)(x) = a + "bS(x) + (1 ¡ ")bT(x)
= "(a + bS(x)) + (1 ¡ ")(a + bT(x))
= "c(S)(x) + (1 ¡ ")c(T)(x):
The second condition is satis¯ed as c(S)(x) = a + bS(x) ¸ c(T)(x) = a + bT(x)
whenever S(x) ¸ T(x) for any x 2 [0;1].
Symmetrically to the description of tax avoidance activities, we consider that
an cost function represents labor supply activities whenever TP(x) < 0, when x 2
(0;1); the amount of money which is not collected by the government represents a
bene¯t for the voter. Such a modeling is also appropriate to represent a schooling
decision, in which some investment in education leads to a rise in income. The
proofs provided are done for the tax avoidance activities case and are symmetric for
the case representing labour activities.
Example 3: Labor supply. For some b 2 [0;1], c(T)(x) = ¡bx + T((1 + b)x). A
voter with income x makes an e®ort to raise his income. This rise in income gets
compensated by a rise in his income tax burden. Given any ex-ante tax function
T, its associated cost function satis¯es c(T)(x) = ¡bx + T((1 + b)x) with b > 0.
The rise in income is represented by ¡bx, and T((1 + b)x) symbolizes the increase
in the tax burden. Therefore, a voter makes an e®ort if bx > T((1 + b)x) ¡ T(x)
(his rise in income is higher than his rise in taxes). Besides, in such a problem the
amount of money that a voter with income x allocates to the government is equal
to TG(x) = T((1 + b)x). To see that the ¯rst condition holds with this modeling, it
su±ces to write that for any function S 2 C[0;1] and for any " 2 [0;1]:
c("S + (1 ¡ ")T)(x) = ¡bx + ["S((1 + b)x) + (1 ¡ ")T((1 + b)x)]
= "(¡bx + S((1 + b)x) + (1 ¡ ")(¡bx + T((1 + b)x))
= "c(S)(x) + (1 ¡ ")c(T)(x):
It is simple to see that the second condition is satis¯ed; as c(S)(x) = ¡bx + S((1 +
b)x) ¸ ¡bx + T((1 + b)x) whenever S(x) > T(x).
Given an ex-ante tax function T and its corresponding cost function c(T), we
de¯ne its ex-post tax function t as the real amount of expenditure of voters once
the distortion has taken place.
8De¯nition 3 (Ex-post tax function). Given an ex-ante tax function T and its cost
function c(T), we de¯ne the ex-post tax function t as a continuous function such
that:
t(x) = minf T(x) ; c(T)(x)g:
The game proceeds in three stages:
( Stage 1 Simultaneously, parties 1 and 2 announce their strategies T1 and T2
to voters.
( Stage 2 A voter votes for party 1 if x ¡ t1(x) > x ¡ t2(x) and conversely for
party 2. If a voter is indi®erent, he randomizes over both parties as usual.
( Stage 3 The winner of the election sets up a tax function, and voters decide
whether to pay full taxes or to make an e®ort.
2.1 The size of the government
The political game is played on the ex-ante tax functions. However, voters vote
according to their preferences over the ex-post tax functions. This work assumes
that political parties anticipate the e®ect of the cost function on redistribution.
Hence, political parties can only advocate tax functions that are budget-balanced
after the voter's binary decision has taken place.
Given the set of voters who pay full taxes ET, the government revenues are repre-
sented by function G(T). Hence,
the government collects G(T)(x) =
(
T(x) if x 2 ET
TG(x) if not.
Hence, given an ex-ante tax function T, the function G(T) represents the amount
of money collected by the government once voters have made their binary decision.
Whenever a voter's income x belongs to ET, the voter pays T(x) to the government
(i.e full taxes), and if x 62 ET, the voter decides to make an e®ort, and therefore
the amount of money he pays to the government equals TG(x). We assume that a
party can only advocate budget-balanced ex-ante tax functions that belong to the
set R i® the ex-ante tax function collects a predetermined amount of taxes r > 0.
Formally,




9The set R is viewed as a metric subspace of C[0;1] and is divided in two subsets: E
which stands for the e±cient tax functions and I for the ine±cient ones, so that
R = E [ I:
An e±cient tax function T 2 E maximizes the aggregate level of ¯nal income and
can be de¯ned as follows:
T 2 E ()
Z 1
0













An ine±cient tax function in the set R belongs to the set I if it does not belong
to the set E. We represent by Q an element of Q, the taxation environment which
consists of the following set
Q = f(F;r;c(T)) : F 2 F ;r > 0g:
3 The political game
Take any taxation environment Q 2 Q, and consider two political parties who want
to maximize their vote share. Parties are restricted to pick ex-ante tax functions
from the set R. If party 1 proposes the ex-ante tax function S and party 2 proposes
T, the share of voters that strictly prefer the ex-post tax function s over the ex-post
tax function t is denoted as




Symmetrically, the share of voters who strictly prefer the victory of party 2 is
W(T;S). To refer to the pure endowment game (taxes are not distortionary), we
use the notation w(S;T) = pF(S(x) < T(x)). We assume that the parties' purpose
is to maximize their utility ui : R2 ! [¡1;1], which is understood as the relative
popular support of the proposed ex-ante tax function. That is, we suppose that
ui(S;T) =
(
W(S;T) ¡ W(T;S) if i = 1
W(T;S) ¡ W(S;T) if i = 2.
10We denote the two player zero-sum symmetric game as G = (R;(u1;u2)).
One of the main di±culties to determine the structure of equilibria in this po-
litical game is the lack of existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium as stated
by Myerson [14] and Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok [3], due to the discontinuity of the
utility payo®s.9 Thus, we cannot guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in pure
strategies for the game G.
Even if mixed strategy equilibria are considered to be conceptually acceptable
in political environments since Downs [6], they have not been extensively used in
the class of game which we study. In addition to the classical interpretations of
mixed strategies10, the novel one stated by Laslier [7] seems particularly relevant
to our context. Under this approach, parties are ambiguous and this ambiguity is
represented by their mixed strategies. Each voter associates one party with one tax
function. The probability that a policy alternative is o®ered by a party equals the
fraction of voters identifying a party with this alternative.
A mixed strategy over the set of allowed tax functions R is a Borel probability
measure over R. Therefore, party i's expected payo® of the pair of mixed strategies




ui(S;T)d(¹1 £ ¹2); ¹i 2 B(R); i = 1;2;
where B(R) denotes the set of all Borel probability measures of R. The expected
utility payo® Ui : B(R)2 ! [¡1;1] is well de¯ned, since any Borel measurable
function on R is measurable in the associated product measure space. Then,
the mixed extension of G = (R;(u1;u2)) is denoted by ^ G = (B(R);(U1;U2)):
The pair ¹ = (¹1;¹2) constitutes a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game ^ G =
(B(R);(U1;U2)), if for every mixed strategy ^ ¹ 2 B(R), the expected payo® (to party
1) satis¯es
U1(^ ¹;¹2) · U1(¹1;¹2);
U1(¹1; ^ ¹) ¸ U1(¹1;¹2);
9To see this, it su±ces to build an example where W(Sn;T)¡W(T;Sn) is positive for every n,
and W(S;T) ¡ W(T;S) < 0 with Sn uniformly converging towards S as n goes to in¯nity. For a
more detailed construction, see section 4.2 of Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok [3].
10See Rubinstein [19].
11by the MinMax Theorem, as the political game is zero-sum. Besides, the expected
payo® to both parties satis¯es Ui(¹1;¹2) = 0 in equilibrium.
3.1 Existence of equilibrium
Once we have properly de¯ned the game, we address the existence of political equi-
librium. As we assume in¯nite space strategies, the existence of an equilibrium is
not ensured11. The existence problem with in¯nite space strategies is not a trivial
matter. However, the distortions introduced within this work do not deeply mod-
ify the structure of the game (when compared with a pure endowment economy).
Thus, we show that the existence problem can be solved by checking that the politi-
cal game satis¯es the conditions stated by Reny [16] (Proposition 5:1 and Corollary
5:2) (in a similar manner to the one used by Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok [3]). To
show that the mixed extension of the game veri¯es payo®-security we use a novel
result of Monteiro and Page [13] which simpli¯es the proof.12
Theorem 1. The political game (R;(u1;u2)) has at least one mixed strategy equi-
librium.
To prove that the game G = (R;(u1;u2)) has a mixed strategy equilibrium, we
need to show that it satis¯es the following properties:
1. the sum of utility functions u1 + u2 is upper semi continuous in T on R,
2. the strategy space R is a compact subset of C[0;1],
3. the utility functions ui are both bounded and measurable,
4. the mixed extension of the game ^ G = (B(R);(U1;U2)) of G is payo®-secure.
The function u1+u2 is continuous and so upper semi continuous, which implies that
property 1 is veri¯ed. Properties 2, 3 and 4 are proved in the appendix.
11To ensure existence of equilibrium in mixed strategies, one can assume that parties dispose
from a ¯nite set of tax functions. However, the result concerning e±ciency (Theorem 2) will
not anymore hold. Indeed in the current setting, the number of tax functions is not arbitrarily
bounded. Hence, a party can build a tax function that covers any ine±cient tax function as stated
by Proposition 1.
12The author would like to thank Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau for this useful suggestion.
124 E±cient Political Competition
To prove that the parties uniquely propose e±cient tax functions in equilibrium, we
show that advocating an ine±cient tax function is weakly dominated. Proposition
1 shows that whenever a party advocates an ine±cient income tax function (which
does not maximize the aggregate level of ¯nal income), his opponent can build
another tax function which is unanimously preferred by the electorate.
Once we have proved that ine±ciency is weakly dominated, we show that the
support of both parties' strategies does not include ine±cient tax functions. To do
so, we need to introduce some binary relation between the tax functions. For any
pair of tax functions S and T in the set R, we de¯ne the covering relation C as
follows:
S C T () ui(S;T) > 0 and
8 Z 2 R : ui(S;Z) ¸ ui(T;Z) and
9 Z 2 R : ui(S;Z) > ui(T;Z):
The uncovered set, denoted by U, is a subset of the set of tax functions R and
consists of the maximal elements of the covering relation: S 2 U if and only if there
is no T 2 R such that T CS. We let V = RnU denote the set V of covered strategies.
Using the covering relation C, Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows: any
ine±cient tax function T 2 I belongs to the set of covered strategies. This observa-
tion is crucial, because a result of Banks, Duggan and Le Breton [2] (included in the
appendix) entails that, under some conditions, the support of any mixed strategy
equilibrium is included in the uncovered set U.
Proposition 1. For any tax function T 2 I under which the aggregate ¯nal income
is not maximized, we can construct one tax function S 2 R such that s(x) · t(x)
for any x 2 [0;1] and pF(s(x) < t(x)) > 0.
Theorem 2 formalizes the idea that, in equilibrium, rational parties advocate
e±cient tax functions in which the aggregate ¯nal income is maximized. The proof
is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 2. In any mixed strategy equilibrium of the game (R;(u1;u2)), parties
solely propose e±cient tax functions, i.e. for any equilibrium (¹1;¹2) of this game,
13we have for some set D µ E
¹1(D) = ¹2(D) = 1:
5 On the shape of income taxation
Once we have analyzed the e±ciency of the electoral competition, we focus on the
shape of income taxation in equilibrium. In order to make the arguments trans-
parent, the analysis is restricted to the °at tax game throughout. Hence, the cost
function c(T) satis¯es c(T) = ax for some a 2 [0;1]. A simple interpretation for the
°at tax game is based on the classical economic situation in which two countries
are involved. In country A, there is an electoral competition between two parties.
Parties make electoral promises to voters over the income tax functions they will
apply if elected. However, both parties and voters know that voters have the possi-
bility of not paying taxes in country A by paying some amount of money in country
B. A natural question that arises is how should parties react to this possibility of
not paying taxes? We ¯rst show that this outside option modi¯es the classical ob-
servation according to which the majority of the voters prefer progressive taxation.
However, when the set of available tax functions is rich enough, the political appeal
for progressivity is restored. Hence, even taking into account the possibility that
voters will not pay taxes, a strategic party should advocate progressive taxation to
maximize his probability of victory. A discussion on the robustness of our results
with di®erent cost functions is provided.
5.1 Regressive taxation can be unanimously preferred
We give an example that shows how unfounded the arguments given in the public
debate can be in our setting. Distortions can have a deep impact on the predictions of
the model. Our de¯nition of the tax functions eliminates the traditional observation
that low income voters prefer progressive tax functions. Such an observation was
formalized by Marhuenda and Ortu~ no Ort¶ ³n [11] as follows: let S, T be two ex-ante
tax functions such that S is non-linear convex on [0,1], T is concave on [0;1] and
such that
R 1
0 S(x)dF = r ·
R 1
0 T(x)dF for some 0 < r <
R 1
0 xdF. The intersection
of both curves is denoted by µ 2 [0;1] and is located above the median m of the
income distribution F, which in our framework is denoted by w(S;T) > 1=2. Their
14result is conditional on the fact that function F is such that the median income
m = F ¡1(1
2) is lower than the mean income
R 1
0 xdF. We refer to the previous
result as the political appeal for progressivity. An equilibrium version of the previous
inequality is given by Carbonell-Nicolau [3] in a pure endowment economy. The
following example shows that it could be the case that a regressive tax function can
be unanimously preferred in equilibrium to a progressive one when tax functions are
distortionary.
Example 4: Let Q 2 Q be a taxation environment such that r = 0:1 and the
income distribution function F has the following density:
f(x) = 2 ¡ 2x; x 2 [0;1]:
This income distribution is such that the median income m is lower than the mean
income (m = 0:29 and
R 1
0 xdF = 1=3). The cost function c(T) is equal to c(T)(x) =






2 + x) and T(x) = ¡0:05x
2 + 0:325x with x 2 [0;1]:
The convexity of S and the concavity of T are ensured by the fact that S00 > 0 and
T 00 < 0.
Given the ex-ante tax functions S and T, then their respective ex-post tax functions
s and t are such that
s(x) = minfS(x);axg;
and
t(x) = minfT(x);axg = T(x):
In this game, the ex-post tax function t coincides with the ex-ante tax function T,
as T(x) < ax for every x 2 [0;1). The cost ax of making an e®ort is too high, and
so every voter pays full taxes under the ex-ante tax function T.
The voters who pay full taxes under the tax function S are the ones with an income
in the set ES = fx 2 [0;1] j S(x) · axg = f0 · x · 0:607g. Besides, both ex-ante
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Figure 1: The regressive tax function T is unanimously preferred to the progressive
tax function S.
As depicted by Figure 1, the regressive tax function T is unanimously preferred
to the progressive tax function S, i.e.
W(T;S) = 1:
Hence, in the game G = ((S;T);(u1;u2)), the regressive tax function is unani-
mously preferred by voters, and consequently it will be the tax function advocated
by both political parties in equilibrium. Thus, in our framework it is not anymore
true that low income voters prefer progressive income taxation. A progressive tax
function in which an important share of voters do not pay full taxes generates an
ine±ciency in the economy.
165.2 The political appeal for progressivity
One of the aims of the positive theory of income taxation is to understand the
shape of income tax functions that will be implemented by self-interested parties
in equilibrium. The previous example shows that traditional arguments do not
anymore hold within our setting. However, as will be shown, the political appeal
for progressivity can be restored when the political parties can choose their electoral
promises from a set of taxes rich enough. If we allow parties to advocate progressive
and regressive tax functions, only progressive taxation will be implemented.
Let ^ R be the restricted policy space in which ex-ante tax functions are either
progressive or regressive13. Formally, T 2 ^ R i® T is progressive or regressive, and
T 2 R. Thus, the set ^ R is the union of the set of progressive tax functions Rp and
the set of regressive tax functions Rr. Among the set of progressive tax functions,
the subclass Np of non-linear members deserves special attention.
Proposition 2. Any non-linear progressive tax function S 2 Np with which every
voter pays full taxes is preferred to any regressive tax function T 2 ^ R (provided than
the median income is lower than the mean one).
Condition 1 The set ^ R contains non-linear progressive tax functions with which
every voter pays full taxes.
Theorem 3. In any mixed strategy of the °at tax game ( ^ R;(u1;u2)), parties solely
propose progressive tax functions whenever the set ^ R satis¯es condition 1. Formally,
any equilibrium (¹1;¹2) of this game satis¯es from
¹1(Np) = ¹2(Np) = 1:
5.3 Discussion
The previous result shows that the political appeal for progressivity is robust to the
introduction of distortions on the °at tax game. It is only required that parties can
propose progressive tax functions with which every voter pays full taxes. Even if it
need not be the case that any progressive tax function is preferred to any regressive
tax function (as it is the case in a pure endowment economy), we can still show that
13Let us recall that an ex-ante tax function is said to be progressive (regressive) whenever it is
convex (concave).
17any progressive tax function with which every voter pays full taxes is preferred to
any regressive one. Hence, as it is weakly dominated for both parties to propose
regressive taxation, the political appeal for progressivity is restored. Our result is
hence a generalization of Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok [3]: whenever the cost function
c(T) satis¯es c(T)(x) ¸ x (i.e. a ¸ 1), every voter pays full taxes. Hence, as the cost
of making an e®ort is too high, we are back in an economy without distortions, a pure
endowment economy. Therefore, the political appeal for progressivity (Theorem 3,
Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok [3]) is a particular case of our result.
The results are identical when studying the class of smooth cost functions. For-
mally, the de¯nition of smooth cost function is as follows.
De¯nition 4. A cost function is smooth whenever c(T) progressive (resp. regressive)
if and only if T progressive (resp. regressive).
The reason the result is valid for this class of smooth cost functions is simple.
Let us pick a convex ex-ante function S with which every voter pays full taxes and a
concave ex-ante function T. As every voter pays full taxes, the ex-post tax function
s coincides with the ex-ante tax function S which implies that s is convex. Besides,
the minimum of two concave functions is concave. Hence, the ex-post tax function t
is concave as the cost function is concave. Whenever the deadweight cost of making
an e®ort is positive (i.e. TP(x) > 0 used to represent tax avoidance activities)14, the
ex-post tax function t collects an amount of money strictly higher than the ex-post
tax function s. Using Marhuenda and Ortu~ no-Ortin [11] result, we can prove that
the unique intersection between the ex-post tax functions s and t must be located
above the median income so that the same result applies.
6 Conclusion
We have built a simple model to study the interaction between the political arena
and the determination of income taxation in the presence of distortionary taxes.
The mixed strategy approach has allowed us to obtain an equilibrium of the game.
Furthermore, in equilibrium, parties only advocate e±cient tax functions. Whenever
14When the deadweight cost of making an e®ort is negative (TP(x) < 0 used to represent labour
supply decisions), Condition 1 does not ensure that Theorem 3 holds. In this case, a su±cient
condition for such a theorem to hold is that the policy space contains a progressive tax function
with which every voter provides an e®ort.
18a party does not advocate a tax function that maximizes aggregate ¯nal income,
the other party can build a unanimously weakly preferred tax function that collects
the same amount of taxes. This result shows the existence of a link between the
literature of probabilistic voting theory15 and the positive theory of income taxation.
According to our results parties' mixed strategies play the same role as ideological
components in the probabilistic voting theory to ensure both the existence and
e±ciency of equilibrium in these political games.
Finally, as far the shape of income taxation is concerned, we have shown that
when taking into account distortions generated by tax functions, it is no longer true
that low-income voters always prefer progressive taxation, and it can even be the case
that every voter in the society prefers regressive income taxation. However, under
mild conditions, parties propose progressive taxation. This result shows that the
political appeal for progressivity is robust to the introduction of distortions. When
parties anticipate that voters have the possibility of not paying full taxes, they still
advocate progressive taxation to maximize their probability of victory. This result
is in accordance with observed income tax schemes in most OECD countries.
One of the main limits of our model is an implicit assumption of the modeling
strategy. We consider here a one-shot voting game with binding electoral promises,
and thus do not take into account commitment problems. Our conclusion applies
only to what has been called \pre-electoral politics". Problems associated with
commitment are a source of ine±ciencies and are not taken into account in our
model.
Besides, the relationship between taxation and the beliefs held by voters about
the consequences of their own actions and those of others on the aggregate tax
system are very important and not well understood. An example of this lack of
understanding is the classic question of why people pay taxes given the low proba-
bility of being audited (i.e. why is there not more tax evasion). Thus, introducing
a system of social norms as has been previously done in the literature of tax evasion
could be an interesting extension of this work.
15As argued by Persson and Tabellini [15], probabilistic voting theory has become a standard
tool in political economy.
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A Appendix: Properties of the sets ES
Let Q 2 Q be a taxation environment. Let us de¯ne for any continuous function
T 2 C[0;1], the set ET as follows:
ET = fx 2 [0;1] j T(x) · c(T)(x)g:
For any pair of functions S and T in C[0;1] and any " 2 [0;1], let S(") :
[0;1] ! [0;1] be the function such that S(")(x) = "S(x) + (1 ¡ ")T(x). To simplify
the notations, we assume that the cost function associated to the nil function is
identically equal to zero: for any x 2 [0;1], we write c(0)(x) = 0 for any x 2 [0;1]
so that E0 = [0;1].
Lemma 1 (Inclusion Lemma). If the sets ES and ET satisfy ES ½ ET then ES ½
ES(") ½ ET.
Proof. Let T and M be a pair of functions in C[0;1]. For any " 2 [0;1], let S(") :
[0;1] ! [0;1] be the function such S(")(x) = "S(x) + (1 ¡ ")T(x). Then, the sets
21ES, ET and ES(") are given by :
ES = fx 2 [0;1] j S(x) < c(S)(x)g;
ET = fx 2 [0;1] j T(x) < c(T)(x)g and
ES(") = fx 2 [0;1] j S(")(x) < c(S("))(x)g:
We assume that ES ½ ET that is if x 2 ES then x 2 ET.
Let us ¯rst show that if x 2 ES then x 2 ES("). To do so, let us assume that there
exists x 2 [0;1] such that x 2 ES and x 62 ES("). Given that x 62 ES("), we know
that S(")(x) ¸ c(S("))(x) which implies that
"S(x) + (1 ¡ ")T(x) ¸ "c(S)(x) + (1 ¡ ")c(T)(x) ()
(1 ¡ ")[T(x) ¡ c(T)(x)] ¸ "[c(S)(x) ¡ S(x)]:
As we know that x 2 ES, we can write that S(x) < c(S)(x) so that the right
part of the inequality is positive. Thus, given that " 2 [0;1], the left part of the
inequality must be strictly positive to satisfy the inequality. However, this would
imply T(x) ¡ c(T)(x) > 0 and so that x 62 ET. This is a contradiction as we have
assumed that if x 2 ES then x 2 ET which implies that ES ½ ES(").
Let us now show that if x 2 ES(") then x 2 ET. To do so, let us assume that there
exists x 2 [0;1] such that x 2 ES(") and x 62 ET. Given that x 2 ES("), we know
that S(")(x) < c(S("))(x) which implies that
"S(x) + (1 ¡ ")T(x) < "c(S)(x) + (1 ¡ ")c(T)(x) ()
(1 ¡ ")[T(x) ¡ c(T)(x)] < "[c(S)(x) ¡ S(x)]:
As we know that x 62 ET, we can write that T(x) ¸ c(T)(x) so that the left part of
the inequality is positive. Thus, given that " 2 [0;1], the right part of the inequality
must be strictly positive to satisfy the inequality. However, this would imply that
c(S)(x) > S(x) and then x 2 ES. This is a contradiction as we have assumed that
if x 2 ES then x 2 ET, implying that ES(") ½ ET.
Lemma 2 (Equality lemma). If the sets ES and ET satisfy ES = ET then ES =
ES(") = ET.
Proof. To show ES µ ES("), let us assume that there exists some x 2 ES. As
by assumption ES = ET, if x 2 ES then S(x) < c(S)(x) and T(x) < c(T)(x).
22Besides, by de¯nition S(")(x) = "S(x)+(1¡")T(x). Then, given that c(S("))(x) =
"c(S)(x)+(1¡")c(T)(x), we can write that S(")(x) > c(S("))(x), that is x 2 S(").
To prove the other inclusion ES(") µ ES, let us assume that there exists some
x 2 ES(") and such that x 62 ES. Given that x 2 ES(") then S(")(x) < c(S("))(x).
Besides, x 62 ES entails that S(x) ¸ c(S)(x) and that T(x) ¸ c(T)(x) as ES =
ET. Then, given that c(S("))(x) = "c(S(x)) + (1 ¡ ")c(T)(x), we can write that
c(S("))(x) ¸ S(")(x), that is x 62 S(") which is a contradiction.
Lemma 3. For any ex-ante tax function T there exists an ex-ante tax function S
such that S(x) · T(x) for any x 2 [0;1] with ET ½ ES and pF(ET n ES) > 0.
Proof. Let T be an ex-ante tax function with ET ½ [0;1]. Let us pick the function
"T for some " > 0 which satis¯es "T(x) · T(x) for any x 2 [0;1]. The function "T is
a convex combination of T and the nil function N with N(x) = 0 for any x 2 [0;1].
By assumption, we have EN = [0;1] so that EN ½ ET and then by the Inclusion
Lemma, we write that EN ½ E"T ½ ET. It su±ces to pick some " low enough such
that pF(ET n E"T) > 0 and then to choose S = "T to conclude the proof.
Lemma 4. Let S and T be a pair of tax functions such that S(x) · T(x) for any
x 2 [0;1]. If ET ½ ES with pF(ET n ES) > 0 then pF(s(x) < t(x)) > 0.
Proof. Let S and T be a pair of tax functions such that S(x) · T(x) for any x 2 [0;1]
with ET ½ ES. To prove the claim, let us assume that pF(s(x) < t(x)) = 0. Given
the second property of the cost functions, we know that if S(x) · T(x) for any
x 2 [0;1] then c(S)(x) · c(T)(x) for any x 2 [0;1]. Hence, we can write that the
respective ex-post tax functions s and t satisfy s(x) · t(x) as s = minfS;c(S)g and
t = minfT;c(T)g. Besides as we have assumed that pF(s(x) < t(x)) = 0, then we
can write that pF(s(x) = t(x)) = 1. To do so, we must have that s(x) = t(x) on
any subset A ½ [0;1] such that pF(A) > 0.
Given that ET ½ ES with pF(ESnET) > 0, we can write that for any x 2 ESnET,
S(x) = s(x) = t(x) = c(T)(x). However, by de¯nition, for any x 2 ES we have
S(x) < c(S)(x). Therefore, for any x 2 ES n ET, we have c(S)(x) > S(x) = s(x) =
t(x) = c(T)(x) which implies that c(S)(x) > c(T)(x) which is a contradiction as
c(S)(x) · c(T)(x) for any x 2 [0;1].
23B Appendix: Existence of a mixed strategy equi-
librium
Proposition 3. The strategy space R is a compact subset of C[0;1].
Proof. In a metric space, the continuous image of compact space is compact. Hence,
we can show that the set of budget balanced ex-post tax functions is compact by
proving that such a set is the continuous image of a compact space.
By de¯nition, an ex-post tax function s is budget balanced if and only if there ex-
ists an ex-ante tax function T such that s(x) = minfT(x);c(T)(x)g and
R 1
0 G(T)dF ¸
r. We de¯ne a continuous mapping Ã : T ! T £ C(T) from the set of ex-ante tax
functions T to the set T £ C(T), the product set of T and the set of cost functions
C(T) with
Ã(T) = (T;C(T)):
Similarly, we de¯ne a continuous mapping Á : T £ C(T) ! R with R standing for
the set of budget balanced ex-post tax functions,
Á(T;S) = minfT;Sg:
Hence, any ex-post tax function s 2 R satis¯es s 2 (Á ± Ã)(T). In other words,
for every ex-post tax function s there exists an ex-ante tax function T 2 T such that
s = Á(Ã(T)) with both Á and Ã continuous.
Therefore, we have proven that the set of budget-balanced ex-post tax functions
is the continuous image of the set of ex-ante tax functions with
R 1
0 TdF ¸ r16. It
remains to be shown that the set of ex-ante tax functions T such that
R 1
0 TdF ¸ r
is a compact set.
Given that the set C[0;1] is Hausdor® measurable, the Arzelµ a-Ascoli theorem
states that any of its subsets which is bounded, closed and equicontinuous is a
compact subset.
16Let us recall that the proof is done in the case in which the deadweight cost of making an e®ort
is positive. Thus, as we focus on tax sheltering activities the real amount of taxes collected by
the government is lower or equal to the statutory amount. Hence, the set of ex-ante tax functions
satis¯es
R 1
0 TdF ¸ r. In the case, in which the deadweight cost is positive, the set of ex-ante
functions must satisfy
R 1
0 TdF · r as the amount of money collected by the government is higher
or equal than the statutory amount.
24To show that T is bounded, take any two ex-ante tax functions S and T of the
space T. We can write jjS ¡ Tjj1 · k for some positive k as the range of both
functions is located between 0 and 1. Hence, the space T is bounded.
Let us now show that T is closed in C[0;1]. Take any sequence of Tn in T such
that jjTn¡Tjj1 ! 0 for some function T 2 C[0;1]. Then, the sequence Tn uniformly
converges to T and this guarantees that T is an ex-ante tax function.
As any Tn 2 T, we know that
R 1
0 TndF ¸ r. Thus, due to uniform convergence










due to Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem. Thus, the ex-ante tax function
T satis¯es the budget balanced constraint and thus T 2 T which entails that the
set T is closed in C[0;1].
Finally, it needs to be shown that T is equicontinuous. To do so, let us pick some
ex-ante tax function T and 0 · y < x · 1. By de¯nition, we have x¡T(x) · y¡T(y)
which implies that T(x) ¡ T(y) ¸ x ¡ y. Similarly, if x < y, we can write that
T(y)¡T(x) ¸ y ¡x which implies that jT(x)¡T(y)j · jx¡yj for all 0 · x;y · 1.
So, for any x 2 [0;1] and any " > 0, we have jt(x) ¡ t(y)j < " whenever jx ¡ yj < ".
Hence, we can conclude that the set T is equicontinuous and hence that T is a
compact subset of C[0;1].
The function ui(S;T) = W(S;T) ¡ W(S;T) is obviously bounded for any two
given tax functions S and T which entails the ¯rst part of property 3.
Proposition 4. The utility function ui : R2 ! [¡1;1] is measurable for any i = 1;2.
Proof. To show the measurability of the utility function, it su±ces to show that both
W(S;T) and W(T;S) are lower semi continuous for any ex-ante tax functions (S;T)
(and thus measurable). Indeed, the sum of two measurable functions is measurable
and thus ui(S;T) = W(S;T) ¡ W(T;S) is measurable.
A function W : R2 ! [¡1;1] is lower semi continuous if for any sequence (Sn;Tn)
converging to (S;T), the function W veri¯es liminf W(Sn;Tn) ¸ W(S;T). To prove
the lower semi continuity of W, we take a sequence (Sn;Tn) converging to (S;T).
25By Fatou's lemma,











in which the second inequality comes from the observation that liminf 1fsn<tng(x) ¸
1flimsn<limtng(x)17 for any x 2 [0;1]. Then, W(S;T) is lower semi continuous and
whence measurable which proves the claim.
Prior to proceeding with the proof of payo® security, we introduce a de¯nition
from Monteiro and Page [13] that will be necessary throughout.
De¯nition 5. The game G = (R;(u1;u2)) is uniformly payo® secure if for any
S 2 R and every " > 0, there exists a tax function Sl 2 R such that for every
T 2 R, there exists an open neighborhood N(T) of T in R such that
F 2 N(T) =) ui(S
l;F) ¸ ui(S;T) ¡ ":
Besides, if a compact game G is uniformly payo® secure, then its mixed extension
^ G = (B(R);(U1;U2)) is payo® secure.
Proposition 5. The game G = (R;(u1;u2)) is uniformly payo®-secure and hence
its mixed extension ^ G is payo®-secure.
Proof. Let us pick some ex-ante tax function S 2 R and some " > 0. We de¯ne its
ex-post tax function s as s = minfS;c(S)g. Let us choose a tax function Sl such
that for some l 2 (0;1) and some ¸ that veri¯es




for some " > 0 and such the ex-post tax function sl = minfSl;c(Sl)g satis¯es
s
l > s on [l ¡ ¸;l + ¸] and
s
l < s on [0;1] n [l ¡ ¸;l + ¸]
17If the left-hand side of the inequality equals 0 for some x, then sn(x) ¸ tn(x) for in¯nitely
many n, and this means that the right-hand side must be equal to zero.
26with pF(fsl = sg) = 018. We choose a number ´ with




Let D denote the interval [l ¡ ´;l + ´] and Dc its complement on [0;1].
De¯ne
¿ = min
x2[s0+´;1]\Dc js(x) ¡ s
l(x)j:
For any T 2 R, let us take some F 2 N¿(T) such that
jf ¡ tj < ¿ on [0;1];
in which both f and t stand for the respective ex-post tax functions of F and T.
Taking into account previous de¯nitions, we can write
W(S;T) ¡ W(T;S) = 2W(S;T) + pF(s = t) ¡ 1
= 2[pF(fs < tg \ D) + pF(fs < tg \ D
c)]
+ pF(fs = tg \ D) + pF(fs = tg \ D
c) ¡ 1:
As the measure of D is bounded by 2´ and ´ < "
12, the measure of D is less than "
6.
Therefore,
2pF(fs < tg \ D) + pF(fs = tg \ D) < "=2 < ":
Then it follows that
W(S;T) ¡ W(T;S) < " + 2pF(fs < tg \ D
c) + pF(fs = tg \ D
c) ¡ 1:
18In the case in which we cannot pick a function sl such that pF(fsl = sg) > 0, a similar proof
applies.
27Therefore, applying a simple decomposition, we write
W(S;T) ¡ W(T;S)
< " + 2[pF(fs
l < s < tg \ D
c) + pF(fs
l ¸ s < tg \ D
c)]
+ pF(fs
l < s = tg \ D
c) + pF(fs
l ¸ s = tg \ D
c) ¡ 1
= " + 2[pF(ff · s
l < s < tg \ D
c) + pF(ff > s
l < s < tg \ D
c)
+ pF(ff · s
l ¸ s < tg \ D
c) + pF(ff > s
l ¸ s < tg \ D
c)]
+ pF(ff · s
l < s = tg \ D
c) + pF(ff > s
l < s = tg \ D
c)
+ pF(ff · s
l ¸ s = tg \ D
c) + pF(ff > s
l ¸ s = tg \ D
c) ¡ 1:
Given the previous inequalities, if we can show that the following inequalities hold
pF(ff · s
l < s < tg \ D
c) = 0; (a)
pF(ff · s
l < s = tg \ D
c) = 0; (b)
pF(ff · s
l ¸ s < tg \ D
c) = 0; (c)
and pF(ff · s
l ¸ s = tg \ D




< " + 2[pF(ff > s
l < s < tg \ D
c) + pF(ff > s
l ¸ s < tg \ D
c)]
+ pF(ff > s
l < s = tg \ D
c) + pF(ff > s
l ¸ s = tg \ D
c)
+ pF(f = s
l) ¡ 1
· " + 2W(S
l;F) + pF(s
l = f) ¡ 1
= " + W(S
l;F) ¡ W(F;S
l);
as desired which proves that the game G = (R;(u1;u2)) is uniformly payo®-secure.
Furthermore, as the game is compact as shown by Proposition 3, its mixed extension
^ G is payo® secure.
To conclude the proof it remains to be shown that inequalities (a), (b), (c) and
28(d) hold. Any ex-post tax function f 2 N¿(t) satis¯es
t(x) ¡ f(x) < ¿ on [s0 + ´;1] \ D
c:
Besides, sl is lower than s on the interval [s0 + ´;1] \ Dc by at least ¿.
s(x) ¡ s
l(x) ¸ ¿ on [s0 + ´;1] \ D
c;
and s(x) > s
l(x) on [s0 + ´;1] \ D
c:
Combining previous inequalities entails (a) and (b). To see why (c) and (d) hold,
it su±ces to see that pF(fsl ¸ sg \ Dc) = 0 and hence
pF(ff · s
l ¸ s < tg \ D
c) = 0; (c)
and
pF(ff · s
l ¸ s = tg \ D
c) = 0 · pF(f · s
l): (d)
This section has proved the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game
(R;(u1;u2)). Section 5 is devoted to the study of the restricted game ( ^ R;(u1;u2))
in which the set ^ R is de¯ned as follows:
T 2 ^ R () T 2 R and T is convex or concave
The proof of existence is similar to the one presented with the whole strategy space
R and hence is omitted.
C Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. We focus on the case in which the deadweight cost associated included in
the cost function is positive: TP(x) > 0 8 x 2 (0;1). Showing the claim whenever
TP(x) < 0 8 x 2 (0;1) is similar and hence its proof is omitted. Let us recall that
29for any ex-ante tax function T, the government revenues function G(T) satis¯es
G(T)(x) =
(
T(x) if x 2 ES
TG(x) if not
Let us choose some ine±cient ex-ante tax function T 2 I. As function T is budget-
balanced, we can write that
R 1
0 G(T)dF = r.
Let us pick some ex-ante tax function M such that M(x) · T(x) for any x 2 [0;1]
with ET ½ EM with pF(ET n EM) > 0 and
R 1
0 G(M)dF < r. Given M, the ex-post
tax function m is de¯ned as m = minfM ; c(M)g. As we know that M(x) · T(x)
whenever x 2 (0;1), then we can also write that m(x) · t(x) for any x 2 (0;1) by
applying the second property of the cost functions.
We de¯ne for any " 2 [0;1], the function U(") = "T +(1¡")M and its associated
set EU(") = fx 2 [0;1] j U(")(x) < c(U("))(x)g. Therefore U(")(x) · T(x) for any
x 2 [0;1] which implies that c(U("))(x) · c(T)(x) and hence that u(x) · t(x) for
any x 2 [0;1]. Given that the sets ET and EM are such that ET ½ EM, the Lemma
1 entails that ET ½ EU(") ½ EM. Furthermore, given that pF(EU(") n ET) > 0,
Lemma 4 ensures that pF(u(x) < t(x)) > 0.
Then, given the ¯rst property of the cost functions, we can write that the integral






"T(x) + (1 ¡ ")M(x)dF +
Z
[0;1]nEU(")


































































Then if we can choose an "0 such that U("0) satis¯es
R 1
0 G(U)dF = r then the proof
is ¯nished.
If not, let us choose an "0 > 0 such that U = U("0) with
R 1
0 G(U)dF > r. Let us
now pick some ex-ante tax function N such that N(x) · M(x) for any x 2 [0;1] and
such that EM ½ EN with pF(EN n EM) > 0. Then, we de¯ne for any " 2 [0;1], the
function V (") = "T +(1¡")N and its associated set EV (") = fx 2 [0;1]jV (")(x) <
c(V ("))(x)g. By similar reasonings to the ones previously detailed with function U,
we choose an "¤ > 0 such that V = V ("¤) satis¯es
R 1
0 G(V )dF < r and such that
EU = EV.
We de¯ne for any ® 2 [0;1], the function W(®) = ®U + (1 ¡ ®)V and its

















Given Lemma 2, we can write that EW(®) = EU as EU = EV. Therefore, given
19Indeed, whenever x 62 ET, we know that T(x) ¸ c(T)(x) which implies that T(x) > TG(x). To
see this, let us assume that T(x) · TG(x) for some x 62 ET. If this was true then for some x 62 ET,
T(x) · TG(x) < TG +TP(x) = c(T)(x) as an cost function that represents tax avoidance activities
satis¯es TP(x) > 0 for any x 2 (0;1).
































EW(®) V (x)dF +
R
[0;1]nEW(®) VG(x)dF depend on ® as EU = EV = EW(®). Hence, we
have constructed a function W(®) in C[0;1] such that
R 1
0 G(W(®))dF = ®p+(1¡®)q
with p > r and q < r and p and q independent from ®.
Thus, we can choose an ®0 such that W = W(®0) satis¯es
R 1
0 G(W)dF = r
and hence W 2 R. Furthermore, its corresponding ex-post tax function w =
minfW;c(W)g satis¯es w(x) · t(x) for any x 2 [0;1] and so Lemma 4 implies
that pF(w(x) < t(x)) > 0 as EV ½ EM with pF(EM n EV) > 0 which concludes the
proof.
Proposition 6 (Banks, Duggan and Le Breton [2]). The support of any mixed
strategy equilibrium (¹1;¹2) in the game G = (R;(u1;u2)) satis¯es ¹1(^ U) = ¹2(^ U)
for some set ^ U µ U given that:
1. the set R of tax functions is a complete and separable metric space and
2. for any given tax function T 2 R, the set P(T) = f(S;T) 2 R£Rjui(S;T) >
0g is open.
The rest of this section shows that the game G = (R;(u1;u2)) studied within
this work ful¯lls the conditions stated by the previous proposition.
Lemma 5. The set of tax functions R is a complete and separable metric space.
Proof. By de¯nition, the set R of tax functions is viewed as a metric subspace of
C[0;1]. Furthermore, as Proposition 3 shows, the set R is compact. This proves the
claim as any compact metric space is complete and separable.
Lemma 6. In the game G = (R;(u1;u2)), for any tax function T 2 R, the set P(T)
is open.
32Proof. The proof is done for party 1 and the same claim remains true for party 2
as G is a symmetric game. Let us choose a pair of ex-ante tax functions S and
T in the set R such that ES = ET. Furthermore, let us assume that the tax S
belongs to P(T) which implies that u1(S;T) = w(S;T)¡w(T;S) > 0 and such that
jjS ¡ Tjj1 < ± for some positive ± > 0.
To prove that the set P(T) is open, we have to show that there exists a tax
function Z in some neighborhood of S such that u1(Z;T) > 0. To do so, it su±ces
to de¯ne S(") = "S + (1 ¡ ")T for any " 2 [0;1]. Let us recall that the cost
functions corresponding to tax functions S and T are respectively given by c(S)(x) =
SG(x)+SP(x) and c(T)(x) = TG(x)+TP(x). To verify that S(") satis¯es the budget

















Given the Equality lemma (Lemma 2), we can write that ES(") = ET as ES = ET.


























which implies that for any 0 · " · 1,
R 1
0 G(S("))dF = r.
Finally, it remains to be shown that if u1(S;T) > 0 then u1(S(");T) > 0. As
u1(S;T) > 0, we can write that pF(s(x) < t(x)) > 1=2. Given that S(") 2 R, we
de¯ne its corresponding ex-post tax function s" as s" = minfS(");c(S("))g.




S(")(x) if x 2 ES
c(S("))(x) if x 62 ES:
Therefore, if x 2 ES, we can see that whenever S(x) > T(x) (resp. S(x) < T(x))
S(")(x) = "S(x)+(1¡")T(x) > T(x) (resp. S(")(x) < T(x)). Similarly, if x 62 ES,
33we can see that whenever c(S)(x) > c(T)(x) (resp. c(S)(x) < c(T)(x)), we can write
that c(S("))(x) = "c(S)(x)+(1¡")c(T)(x) > c(T)(x) (resp. c(S("))(x) < c(T)(x)).
Previous inequalities imply that pF(s"(x) < t(x)) = pF(s(x) < t(x)) > 1=2,
which implies that S(") 2 P(T) and by de¯nition S(") is in a ±-neighborhood of S
as jjS(") ¡ Tjj1 · jjS ¡ Tjj1 < ±.
Therefore, if we pick Z = S("), we have proven that for any S 2 P(T), there
exists a tax function Z in some neighborhood of S such that Z 2 P(T), showing
that P(T) is an open set.
D Appendix: On the shape of income tax func-
tions
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Let us pick a convex S with ES = [0;1] and a concave T in with ET 6= [0;1].
Their respective ex-post tax functions are denoted by s = minfS;c(S)g = S and










Hence, we can write that Z 1
0
tdF > r;
with t = minfT;c(T)g as TP(x) > 0 which implies that c(T)(x) > TG(x) with
x 2 (0;1). Besides, t is the minimum of two concave functions (as the cost function
is smooth) and then t is concave. Hence, we know that the unique intersection µ
between s = S and t is located above the median (as stated by Marhuenda and
Ortu~ no-Ortin [11]). This concludes the proof as we have proved that W(S;T) >
1=2.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. Proposition 2 states that any progressive tax function S 2 ^ R with ES = [0;1]
is preferred to any regressive tax function T 2 ^ R. Hence, if party 1 proposes a
mixed strategy ¹1 that puts some positive weight over the regressive tax functions
(¹1( ^ Rreg) > 0), his opponent party 2 can beat him by advocating a mixed strategy
34¹2 that replicates party 1's strategy over the set of progressive tax functions and
that puts the same weight on the progressive tax functions S with ES = [0;1] as
¹1 on the set of regressive tax functions. As the game is zero-sum, both parties
are expected to have a zero payo® at equilibrium which shows that advocating ¹1
is not a best response for party 1. As the game is symmetric, repeating the same
argument for party 2 completes the proof.
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